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ash transfer programmes are emerging as indispensable component of
poverty reduction strategies. The objectives of alleviating short-term poverty
and long-term human capital building are what make cash transfers, particularly
conditional ones, attractive. In Latin America, where cash transfers are widely
implemented, impact evaluations show significant positive impacts. Improved
nutritional intakes, access to health and education as well as reduction in poverty
and inequality are observed.
The International Poverty Centre has a comprehensive research agenda on cash
transfer programmes. The work mainly focuses on comparative studies in selected
countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Centre, in collaboration with
international and bilateral agencies, also carries out both quantitative and qualitative
analyses of the impact of cash transfers on poverty and inequality.
This issue of Poverty in Focus presents a collection of articles covering various aspects
of cash transfer programmes.
Degol Hailu and Fabio Veras Soares provide an overview of cash transfer programmes,
particularly focusing on conditional transfers in Latin America and social transfers in
selected African countries.
Tatiana Britto discusses Brazil’s Bolsa Familia tracing its origins, outreach and the critical
political support to the programme.
Iliana Yaschine and Laura Dávila highlight the challenges faced by Mexico’s Oportunidades
programme in designing exit strategies for long-term beneficiaries.
Charity Moore shows that tensions often arise when cash transfer programmes
are funded externally by looking at the cases of Honduras and Nicaragua.
Rafael Perez Ribas, Fabio Veras Soares and Guilherme Issamu Hirata summarize various
evaluations of cash transfer programmes and point to what we know and may not know.
Pablo S.Villatoro examines the different objectives of conditional cash transfer
programmes in Latin America, particularly focusing on the relationship between
the goals of the interventions and the mechanisms utilized.
Michelle Morais de Sa e Silva brings into light the cash transfer programme from
the North – Opportunity New York City and points to its controversial nature.
Sudhanshu Handa and Scott Stewart point out that while directly reaching orphan
children through transfer programmes may work; the strategy may exclude poor ones.
Esther Schuering notes the need for capacity development as well as political
support to scale-up the social cash transfers in Zambia.
Michael Samson and Sheshangai Kaniki emphasize that social pensions are related to
increases in school attendance and poverty reduction, while costing less than
one per cent of GDP.
Krzysztof Hagemejer shows that African countries can afford and need basic
social security to tackle poverty and inequality.
Karla Parra Corrêa and Rafael Perez Ribas describe why cash transfer programmes
must be based on needs assessments for successful implementation.
Degol Hailu, Marcelo Medeiros and Paula Nonaka underscore the need for legally protecting
cash transfer programmes from political changes and economic fluctuations.
We hope this collection of articles contribute to a better understanding of the design,
implementation and impact of cash transfer programmes.
The  EditorsPoverty in Focus   August 2008    3
Introduction
According to the 2005 UN Report on the
World Social Situation “income transfer
programmes that sustain the poorest
families are essential to changing the
structure of opportunities and are key
to reducing the intergenerational
transmission of poverty and inequality”
(p. 2). In the same year, the UN Economic
Commission for Africa recognised the
value of cash transfers in tackling
extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Commission promised resources
of up to US$ 2 billion a year, an amount
that was to rise to US$ 6 billion
a year by 2015.
Given the growing popularity of cash
transfers, the articles in this issue of
Poverty in Focus draw attention to the
conditional cash transfer programmes
(CCTs) in Latin America and social
transfers in Africa.
Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes
CCTs are considered innovative for
several reasons: (i) their targeting
mechanisms; (ii) beneficiaries receive
cash rather than in-kind benefits;
and (iii) the transfers are conditional.
CCTs are designed to increase the
human capital of beneficiaries by
making transfers conditional on
certain requirements, such as school
attendance, visits to health clinics and
renewals of immunisation. Additionally,
CCTs aim to alleviate poverty in
the short-term.
Pablo Villatoro’s article discusses the
tensions that might arise between the
goals of poverty alleviation in the short
run and human capital accumulation in
the long run. Most particularly, he looks
closely at the debate surrounding
targeting mechanisms and graduation
(exit) rules. His discussion is based
on the different approaches that CCT
programmes can take: (i) a pure human
capital accumulation approach; (ii) a
targeted minimum-income guarantee
scheme; and (iii) a focus on increasing
the income-generating potential of adult
members in beneficiary households in
order to encourage graduation from
CCT programmes.
An example of such tensions is that some
CCTs, while having the long-term goal of
sustaining human capital accumulation,
also, and paradoxically, have a three- to
five-year limit, after which beneficiaries
are required to leave the programme.
The timeframes are often the result of
provisions in the external loans that
finance the initiatives, or of the term
limits of the governments that introduce
them. Because of this short-term
financing horizon, some programmes
have lessened the emphasis on human
capital accumulation. Exit rules are
therefore established without due
attention to the persistent vulnerability
of “graduated” families to shocks that
could pull them back into poverty.
In many cases, there are neither effective
exit strategies nor ex-post support
programmes for families that have
graduated from a programme. Broader
policy options are needed to ensure
that beneficiaries do not fall back into
poverty after graduation.
Some of these tensions and challenges
are clearly evident in Tatiana Britto’s
article, which describes the process that
culminated in the launch of Bolsa Família
in Brazil. In particular, she poses the
question of whether Bolsa Família is a
conventional CCT programme like its
predecessor initiatives Bolsa Escola (school
grant) and Bolsa Alimentacão (nutrition
grant), or whether it is a first (targeted)
step towards a universal basic income
grant as already established in Brazilian
by Degol Hailu and  Fábio Veras Soares,
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CCTs, while having the
long-term goal of sustaining
human capital accumulation,
also, and paradoxically, have a
three- to five-year limit, after
which beneficiaries are
required to leave the
programme. The timeframes
are often the result of
provisions in the external
loans that finance the
initiatives, or of the term
limits of the governments
that introduce them.
Needs assessments
can help define feasible
conditionalities, indicate
the need for supply-side
interventions, and provide
information on the cost of
the programmes.
The cost of the social cash
transfer components—those
not related to health—would
vary within a range of 3 to 6
per cent of GDP for countries




have been suggested as a way
of helping families that care
for orphans and children
affected by HIV/AIDS.4 International Poverty Centre
legislation. Tatiana Britto also discusses
the implications of the programme’s
strategy regarding the implementation
of complementary programmes and
graduation rules. On the same issue,
Iliana Yaschine and Laura Dávila explain
the changes made to the graduation
strategies of Mexico’s Oportunidades.
The strategy was reviewed to respond
better to chronic poverty and vulnerability.
Impact evaluations of CCTs have shown
promising results. First, there is evidence
of positive impacts on education and
health outcomes. Second, there is some
evidence of positive impacts on nutrition,
mainly when the CCTs have been
accompanied by the distribution of food
supplements. Third, no major negative
impact on labour supply has been
observed (despite criticisms that CCTs
foster dependency). Fourth, large-scale
programmes have had impressive results
in reducing inequality and some impact
on poverty measures, especially by
narrowing the poverty gap and lessening
the severity of poverty.
Rafael Ribas, Fabio Soares and Guilherme
Hirata summarise what we have learned
from those evaluations and review what
we still need to learn. Most particularly
they consider the added value of
conditionalities and complementary
activities, and discuss the fact that these
programmes are likely to have some
externality effects that can either lessen
or heighten their potential impact.
They argue that greater understanding
of the mechanisms through which CCT
programmes work is needed, in order
to provide policymakers with better
information on design options.
Conditionalities have been controversial
in the cash transfer debate. In some
cases, they are perceived as tools to
guarantee access to universal basic rights
(education and health). In other cases, the
mere existence of conditionalities have
led to the exclusion of some localities
from programmes because of the
inadequate supply of services.
As a result, the discourse has changed in
many Latin American countries and the
term “co-responsibility” has been adopted
instead of conditionality. This change
seeks to emphasise that governments
have the responsibility to guarantee
the adequate supply of education and
health services, so that beneficiary families
can comply with the programmes’
requirements. In such a context, and as
argued in the article by Karla Correa and
Rafael Ribas, needs assessment exercises
may be crucial to designing CCT
programmes. Needs assessments can
help define feasible conditionalities,
indicate the need for supply-side
interventions, and provide information
on the cost of the programmes.
The conditionality issue is clearly evident
in the only case from the North,
Opportunity New York City, which is
discussed by Michelle Morais de Sa e
Silva. She points out the implications of
the programme for policies designed to
improve pupils’ performance at school.
She also questions the effectiveness
of linking transfers to individual student
performance, since that approach may
divert education policy away from
supply-side issues.
The low cost of CCTs, relative to
traditional in-kind social assistance
interventions, is another attractive
feature of the programmes. The costs
of Brazil’s Bolsa Família and Mexico’s
Oportunidades—the two largest
programmes in the region—are much
less than 1 per cent of GDP. The way
programmes are financed, however,
can have crucial implications for their
financial and political sustainability.
In her article, Charity Moore analyses the
cases of PRAF II in Honduras and the Red
de Protección Social (RPS) in Nicaragua, and
observes that external funding through
loans poses new challenges to CCT
programmes. She shows the difficulties
encountered in integrating the externally
funded PRAF II with the domestically
funded PRAF I in Honduras. She also
recounts the brief history of RPS:
although it exhibited the best results
in impact evaluations, the programme
failed to gain enough internal support
to ensure its continuity.
Ownership and domestic political
support are critical to the success of
CCTs, and these can only be gained
by institutionalising the programmes.
It is crucial to generate a minimum
consensus so that CCTs are not viewed
as simply a “single government
programme”, but as part of a broader
policy geared towards strengthening a
country’s social protection and poverty
reduction strategies.
National ownership and domestic
political support, however, are complex
issues. On the one hand, as Tatiana Britto
notes, strong support from incumbent
governments and the programmes’
association with senior political figures
(usually the president) help facilitate
implementation.
On the other hand, this high visibility
may compromise the continuity of
the programmes when governments
change. Again, this trade-off can only
be minimised by institutionalising
transfer schemes. This in turn requires
transparency in the initiatives’
implementation and financing. A clearly
defined legal framework, as argued
by Degol Hailu, Marcelo Medeiros and
Paula Nonaka, is an essential element
of the institutionalisation process.
The integration of CCTs with broader
social policies can minimise the risks
involved in consolidating the dual
system that characterises social
protection in Latin American.
In most countries, for instance,
social policy consists of social
insurance systems that cover only
formal sector workers, as well as
residual social assistance initiatives
that protect the extremely poor
during crises (Bastagli, 2007). CCTs can
complement such systems, especially
if they are institutionalised and
integrated into a national social
protection strategy.
The immediate
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Social Cash Transfers
Social cash transfers (SCTs) have been
widely discussed in a number of
African countries. Since the Livingstone
Conference on Social Protection in March
2006, governments and multilateral
institutions such as the African Union
have been increasingly engaged in the
discussion of SCTs in the region. SCTs,
however, are not a novelty in Africa.
Mauritius has a universal basic pension
scheme that was established in the 1950s.
Namibia also has a longstanding social
pension programme.
South Africa is well known for its rights-
based approach to cash transfers, with
large programmes such as the old age
pension, the disability grant and the
child support grant. Even less-developed
Mozambique has implemented the
Programa de Subsidio de Alimentos (PSA),
a non-contributory social transfer to
people unable to work. The PSA, which
has more than 100,000 beneficiaries, can
be considered a large-scale programme
in comparison to the present pilot
schemes in other African countries.
SCT initiatives, however, are more the
exception than the rule in the continent.
The challenges to establishing SCTs
in Sub-Saharan African countries are
numerous. First, there is a deeply
entrenched belief that cash transfers
are hand-outs that would reduce
labour participation. Second, there is a
widespread perception that transfers
would divert resources from investment
in infrastructure and much-needed
spending on social services such as public
(free) provision of primary and secondary
education and primary health care.
The immediate challenge is to convince
finance ministers and governments
generally that SCTs are not simply
hand-outs but necessary social
investments. They also should be
conceived as complementary to the
expansion of social services, with
a view to reaching poor families.
The article by Michael Samson and
Sheshangai Kaniki sums up the available
evidence on the developmental impact
of social pensions. They present evidence
showing that cash transfers have a
positive impact on education and health
outcomes even in the absence of
conditionalities. SCTs are also conducive
to an increase in the investment made by
households, and help households to
manage social risk.
Esther Schuering’s article describes the
present pilot cash transfer programmes
in Zambia and analyses the challenges
of institutionalising SCTs within the
country’s mainstream social policies.
She highlights the difficulties involved
in securing support from the Ministry
of Finance to develop a national
programme based on the lessons
learned from the pilot schemes.
Extending the programmes to
large-scale national coverage is
constrained by cost concerns.
Krzysztof Hagemejer’s article makes the
case for basic social security. He shows
that a basic social security package is
affordable and can encompass:
(i) universal access to essential health
care services; (ii) a universal basic old-age
and disability pension; (iii) basic child
benefits for the first two children; and
(iv) basic social assistance providing a
100-day employment guarantee to the
poorest 10 per cent of household heads
of working age.
The cost of the SCT components—those
not related to health—would vary within
a range of 3 to 6 per cent of GDP for
countries like Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Senegal and
Tanzania. He also proposes ways of
achieving those goals gradually.
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has eroded
traditional family support networks and
many orphans have to be cared for by
their grandparents and/or uncles and
aunts. This situation is particularly
worrying in East and Southern African
(ESA) countries. Cash transfer
programmes have been suggested
as a way of helping families that care for
orphans and children affected by HIV/AIDS.
The article by Sudhanshu Handa and
Scott Stewart discusses alternative
targeting approaches to extend the
coverage of SCTs. The alternatives are
based on current versions of SCT
schemes in ESA countries. These include:
(i) the labour-constrained households
model that gives support to households
without an adult member who is able
to work (Kalomo pilot in Zambia and
Malawi); (ii) households with elderly
or disabled members (Mozambique);
(iii) households with orphans (Botswana);
and (iv) households with children.
Their evidence for Uganda and Malawi
suggests that targeting children
is the best way of reaching the poorest
households and guaranteeing significant
impacts on school enrolment.
One of the challenges for SCTs is
that limited resources make choosing
among different targeting options
problematic. For instance, even if
universal social pension schemes are
to be implemented, the eligibility age
would be the targeting criterion.
This in turn is determined by the
budget available rather than by the
impact on poverty and/or on other
developmental outcomes.
Careful and robust evaluations
of relatively well-established STC
schemes—such as the PSA in
Mozambique and the current pilot
schemes in Zambia, Malawi and
Kenya—may offer important insights
into how to expand SCT programmes
within the current fiscal constraints
faced by most Sub-Saharan African
countries. Such evaluations will be
powerful tools of advocacy to win
support from society at large. 
Bastagli, F. (2007). “From Social Safety Net
to Social Policy? The Role of Conditional
Cash Transfers in Welfare State
Development in Latin America”. London,
STICERD, London School of Economics
and Political Science. Draft paper.
UN (2005) “The Inequality Predicament
Report on the World Social Situation”,
United Nations.
The high visibility of
CCTs may compromise
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Brazil’s Bolsa Família, the world’s
largest conditional cash transfer
programme (CCT), has yielded very
positive results in terms of targeting
and its effects on poverty and inequality
(Soares et al., 2007). The programme is
the flagship initiative of President Lula’s
umbrella social strategy, “Zero Hunger”
(Fome Zero), established in line with his
campaign slogan that every Brazilian
should be entitled to at least three
meals a day.
Bolsa Família now reaches 11.1 million
families across Brazil and provides two
different kinds of benefits: a basic transfer,
completely unconditional and given to
extremely poor families; and a transfer
that varies according to the number of
children in the family up to the age of 17.
This is for poor and extremely poor
families and is conditional on human
capital investments such as school
attendance, immunisation of children and
pre-natal check-ups.
The programme’s rationale is very similar
to that of most CCTs in Latin America: to
combine the short-term goals of poverty
alleviation, through the cash transfers,
with the long-term objectives of
breaking intergenerational poverty
traps, through the conditionalities on
health and education.
The origins of Bolsa Família can be traced
to long before Lula took office. After 21
years of military dictatorship, Brazil
underwent a peaceful transition to
democracy in the mid 1980s. A new
constitution in 1988 emphasised
recognition of social rights and the need
to address a historical debt to the poor.
This constitutional emphasis set the
stage for a controversial debate
in the Brazilian Senate in the early
Currently, Bolsa Família
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programme, on its own,
can lift beneficiaries out
of poverty permanently.
This can only be done with
a synergistic combination of
public policies and economic
growth, which is far beyond
the scope of Bolsa Família.
If the programme is to be
understood as a minimum
income grant, perhaps it
would make more sense to
talk about its expansion





1990s on the establishment of
a universal minimum income.
At the time, scholars had given the press
the idea that income alone was far from
enough to tackle the persistent problem
of poverty. What was needed was an
approach that addressed poverty’s
structural causes, which were seen
as being directly related to the
population’s low levels of schooling.
These two ideas were combined in a
proposal for a cash transfer that would
encourage families to ensure that their
children received schooling, and the
basic design of an education-related
CCT emerged (Lindert et al., 2007).
From 1995 onwards, several Brazilian
municipalities initiated such CCTs. These
were given some prominence in the
press and generally had positive results.
In 2001, President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso introduced an education CCT,
Bolsa Escola, at the national level. This
built on a smaller programme that
transferred resources for municipalities
to implement their own CCTs. Another
large CCT programme, related to health
and nutrition (Bolsa Alimentação), was
created shortly afterwards (Britto, 2008).
When Lula took office at the start
of 2003, in addition to these two large
and targeted CCTs, Brazil had an
unconditional transfer to compensate
poor families for the end of fuel
subsidies (Vale Gás) and a smaller CCT
designed to eradicate child labour (PETI).
The president created his own CCT
initiative (Cartão Alimentação). This
was closely linked to the idea of Zero
Hunger, in that it targeted the most
impoverished areas of the country
and nutrition was its main goal.
Symbolically, this latter programme
by Tatiana Britto,
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was placed in the new Extraordinary
Ministry for Food Security. At the
programme’s start, there was an attempt
to make the transfers conditional on the
purchase of food, but this idea was
dropped after fierce criticism from
different stakeholders and scholars.
This array of similar programmes,
directed at the same target population,
caused inefficiency and led to a
duplication of efforts. Hence the
proposal to establish a reform
programme that would consolidate its
predecessors. In October 2003, therefore,
Bolsa Família was created and shortly
afterwards a new government agency,
the Ministry for Social Development
and the Fight against Hunger, was
established to lead its implementation.
Social assistance and food security
policies were also put under the
Ministry’s administration.
In January 2004, talk of a minimum
income grant regained momentum as a
bill that had been under discussion in
Congress for 10 years was finally passed
and approved by Lula. The law affirms
the right to a guaranteed basic income
in order to cover the fundamental rights
of citizens such as food, education and
health. This basic income is to be
introduced gradually, giving priority
to the neediest groups and in line with
budgetary considerations.
The understanding of the bill’s
supporters was that Bolsa Familia,
although targeted at the poor, was a first
step towards this universal basic income.
Hence the secretariat in charge of Bolsa
Família in the Ministry for Social
Development was called the National
Secretariat for Citizenship Income.
Today there seems to be some dispute as
to whether Bolsa Família is a conventional
CCT or a first step towards a universal
basic income. Although this dispute might
help harness support for the programme
from different political viewpoints, it also
entails some controversies.
For instance, much has been written
in the Brazilian press about potential
disincentives to work and dependence
on the transfers. Interestingly,
evaluation results indicate that the
programme has had no negative impact
on the labour market. On the contrary,
in general its beneficiaries have a higher
rate of participation in the labour market
than non-beneficiaries. This might
be related to the value of the cash
transfers, which perhaps is insufficient
for beneficiaries to stop working unless
they have highly unstable incomes or
precarious jobs. It could also be because
the provision of steady incomes for the
poor might function like a microcredit
scheme, allowing them to make more
rational investments and expenditures
(Medeiros et al., 2008)
As regards dependence on the transfers,
this matter is part of the debate on
exit from the programme, a debate
that is present in most CCTs. When
Bolsa Família began there was a strong
emphasis on its link with what were
called “emancipatory strategies”. Although
this issue is still present, it appears to
have lost strength in the programme’s
official discourse. This is probably
because of a perception that transfers
might be needed for a long period
before beneficiaries can be lifted
out of poverty sustainably.
Currently, Bolsa Família does not have
clear exit rules. The first question to be
asked in a discussion of graduation or
exit rules is: graduation from what?
From the programme or from poverty?
Clearly, no single transfer programme,
on its own, can lift beneficiaries out of
poverty permanently. This can only be
done with a synergistic combination
of public policies and economic growth,
which is far beyond the scope of Bolsa
Família. And if the programme is to be
understood as a minimum income grant,
perhaps it would make more sense to
talk about its expansion strategy rather
than its graduation rules.
The programme faces three significant
challenges in the future. The first is the
question of political sustainability.
Although Bolsa Familia enjoys multi-
partisan support and has managed
to share credit with municipal
governments through decentralised
implementation, it has become very
strongly associated with President Lula.
This might jeopardise its continuation
under a different administration.
Another challenge is to minimise
exclusion errors, either by making
greater efforts to reach the poorest
(this might have substantial political
economy costs, since it would mean
excluding a significant number of near-
poor beneficiaries) or by expanding its
coverage (which would require
additional funds).*
Finally, there is a debate about the
sustainability and replicability of the
programme’s impressive impacts on
poverty and inequality. It can be argued
that these results stem from its sizeable
expansion of coverage in a relatively
short period. Are these one-time impacts
that cannot be replicated? Future
research will answer this question.
Britto, T. (2008). “The Emergence and
Popularity of Conditional Cash Transfers in
Latin America”, in: Armando Barrientos and
David Hulme (eds), Social Protection for the
Poor and Poorest: Concepts, Policies and
Politics. London, Palgrave Macmillan.
Lindert, K.; A. Linder; J. Hobbs and
B. De la Briere (2007). “The Nuts and
Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program:
Implementing Conditional Cash Transfers in
a Decentralized Context” , Social Protection
Discussion Paper No 709. Washington,
World Bank.
Medeiros, M.; T. Britto and F. Soares (2008).
“Targeted Cash Transfer Programmes in
Brazil: BPC and the Bolsa Família”,
IPC Working Paper No 48. Brasilia,
International Poverty Centre.
Soares, F.; R. Ribas and R. Osorio (2007).
“Evaluating the Impact of Brazil’s Bolsa
Família: Cash Transfer Programmes
in Comparative Perspective”,
IPC Evaluation Note No 1. Brasilia,
International Poverty Centre.
*   Contrary to anecdotal evidence often presented
in the Brazilian press, the main targeting issue
for Bolsa Família seems to be under-coverage.
Since the programme works with municipal quotas
of beneficiaries, there is a significant waiting list in
almost all municipalities.  Leakage does occur, but
mostly to those who are very close to the programme’s
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The success of conditional cash
transfer programmes (CCTs) in
improving various indicators of
wellbeing is one of the reasons for their
replication worldwide. However many
issues concerning the design of these
programmes are still under debate. One
such issue is the duration of benefits.
Should the benefits be permanent or
temporary? If temporary, what criteria
should dictate beneficiaries’ exit from
the programme? What type of social
protection system should be in place to
ensure that an exit scheme does not run
counter to the programme’s objectives?
Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly
PROGRESA) is one of the best known CCT
programmes. Its experience with design,
implementation and evaluation has
provided a very important learning
tool for international institutions and
numerous countries. The programme
was created in 1997 to help break the
intergenerational transmission of poverty.
The provision of conditional benefits
seeks to build the human capital of
extremely poor families.
Those benefits include: a cash transfer
for food consumption; nutritional
supplements for small children, as well as
for pregnant and lactating women;
access to primary health services;
scholarships for education from third to
twelfth grade; additional cash incentives
for transition from secondary school
to high school, and for finishing high
school; and cash transfers for elderly
beneficiaries. The benefits are conditional
on the beneficiaries’ attendance at health
education sessions, health check-ups and
school. Oportunidades started in highly
marginal rural communities and was
then expanded to rural and urban areas
throughout the country. It now provides
benefits to 5 million extremely poor
households in all of Mexico’s municipalities.
The question of duration was considered
in the programme’s original design. The
plan was that beneficiary families could
stay in the programme if they remained
eligible. The duration of the benefits
was based on a reassessment of their
socioeconomic status. The reassessment
was to be carried out three years
after the beneficiaries’ admission to
the programme.
It was later established that those
families above a reassessment line—
equivalent to the eligibility line used for
admission, plus the amount of the
monthly cash transfer for food
consumption—would be transferred to a
differentiated scheme. This was to happen
three years after the reassessment survey
in rural areas, and one year after the
survey in urban areas. The families would
stay in the differentiated scheme for three
more years and then they would leave the
programme. This differentiated scheme
consists of the former benefits minus the
cash transfer for food consumption and
the primary school scholarships, which are
assumed to be affordable by beneficiary
families above the eligibility threshold.
The exit strategy is intended to avert
dependence on the programme and
to ensure that only eligible families
remain on the roster. Additionally, the
departure of some beneficiary families
would make room for the inclusion of
other eligible families that were not in
the programme because of budgetary
constraints. The implementation of this
strategy, however, raised significant
concerns. The main concern was
whether the income of those households
reallocated to the differentiated scheme
was at least enough to guarantee a
minimum level of wellbeing.
The challenge was to determine if
beneficiaries would be able to sustain
Why, When and How
Should Beneficiaries
Leave a CCT Programme?
Beneficiaries leave Mexico’s
Oportunidades if they are
above a certain poverty line.
But this strategy does not
mean that beneficiaries have




programmes should not be
tied to poverty criteria.
Because of the absence of
an effective social protection
system, the criteria should be
based on the initial objective
of the programme—building
human capital.
by Iliana Yaschine, El Colegio de México
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their improved wellbeing over time—
especially whether they could uphold
their children’s health and nutrition status,
as well as guarantee continued school
attendance, without monetary incentives.
One of the main discussions was whether
families should leave the programme
according to poverty or human capital
indicators. This highlighted the fact that
Oportunidades is designed to build human
capital in the medium and long-term,
not to fight poverty in the short-term,
even if both objectives have become
intertwined in practice.
After the first families were transferred
to the differentiated scheme in 2003,
independent studies were commissioned
to provide data that would inform
possible adjustments to the strategy
(Escobar and González de la Rocha, 2004;
Escobar, González de la Rocha and Cortés,
2005; Todd, 2006; Solís, Banegas and
Mora, 2007). These studies relied on
quantitative analysis based on panel
data, and qualitative research that
focused on the beneficiaries who were
first admitted to the programme (those
living in rural areas and highly marginal
communities). The research findings
include the following:
 Reaching the improved level
of wellbeing that could move
households above the eligibility line
is a long-term process. After three
years, the deprivation of 98 per cent
of the households in the programme
was not sufficiently reduced to take
them above the eligibility threshold.
After six years, only about 20 per cent
of households crossed this line.
 Many households that were transferred
to the new scheme could cope with
the reduction in benefits without
endangering their investment in
human capital. However, some were
extremely vulnerable and were forced
to reduce their basic food
consumption and/or withdraw
children from school. They included
households with only elderly and sick
members; young households with a
high dependency rate; households
with chronically ill members; and the
households of recent migrants from
rural to urban areas.
 Of the households that crossed the
eligibility line, 42 per cent eventually
returned below the line. Only 4 per
cent of the households analysed in
the panel were able to cross the
eligibility threshold and remain there.
The results of these studies reveal the
need to adjust the exit scheme in order
to take account of the longer-term
nature of the process of poverty
reduction. They suggest the prevalence of
chronic poverty among the beneficiaries,
as well as a high degree of vulnerability.
On the basis of these findings, the
following changes were made to the
scheme between 2006 and 2008:
 The period before the first
reassessment of households was
increased from three to six years.
If households cross the reassessment
line after this period, they will be
transferred immediately to the
differentiated scheme for six more
years. After 12 years they leave
the programme.
 The timeline was equalized for
rural and urban households.
 Households composed wholly
of elderly people were exempted
from the exit strategy.
 Households that leave the
programme may ask to be readmitted
if their living standards deteriorate.
 Households that remain eligible after
the first reassessment of their
socioeconomic status undergo a
second reassessment eight to nine
years after their admittance. If they
are above the reassessment line, they
are transferred immediately to the
differentiated scheme and must leave
the programme three years later.
To date, almost 200,000 households (4 per
cent of those reassessed), mainly from
highly marginal rural communities, have
been transferred to the differentiated
scheme. Some of these have already left
the programme and the rest will do so
according to the rules outlined above.
Households from less marginal
communities and urban areas have
recently been reassessed. The results
available so far suggest that a higher
percentage will be transferred to the
differentiated scheme in the coming
years, but this will not exceed 12 per cent
of the beneficiary households. The small
percentage of households that form part
of the exit strategy is consistent with the
fact that Oportunidades is a well targeted
programme with a long-term objective.
Oportunidades is leading the way in
innovation and learning for CCTs. As a
result of the recent changes, the strategy
now responds better to chronic poverty
and vulnerability. But there are still
challenges that have to be considered
in the future. First, while recent changes
give households more protection against
threats to their children’s human capital
development, exit from the programme
is still determined by poverty criteria
rather than by human capital indicators.
This issue might be addressed in the
near future, since Oportunidades will
revise its targeting criteria in line with
recent regulations.
Second, leaving the programme means
that families are above the extreme
poverty line at a particular moment, but
it does not mean that they are no longer
poor. This is particularly significant in
Mexico’s case, given the limitations of its
social and economic policy. The country
lacks an effective social protection
system, and thus it is not possible
to ensure that households leaving
Oportunidades will have access to other
social programmes or will benefit from
overall economic and labour market
conditions. Families that leave CCT
programmes must have recourse to
other policies that enhance their living
standards and guarantee their social
rights in order to allow them escape
from poverty. 
Escobar, A. and M. González de la Rocha
(2004). “Evaluación cualitativa de mediano
plazo del Programa Oportunidades en las
zonas rurales” in: B. Hernández and M.
Hernández (eds), Evaluación externa de
impacto del Programa Oportunidades 2004.
Mexico, INSP, 247–316.
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F. Cortés (2005). “Documento analítico
del esquema diferenciado de apoyos del
Programa Oportunidades, 2005”. Mexico,
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By definition, conditional cash
transfer programmes (CCTs) are directed
towards poor beneficiaries who must
meet specified requirements in order to
receive the transfers. Beneficiaries are
typically female household heads,
since policymakers assume that these
household members are more inclined to
invest benefits in ways that most favour
children. The programmes focus on some
combination of poverty reduction and
long-term human capital accumulation,
and these goals are met by requiring
beneficiaries to invest in education
and health care.
CCTs, while having similar characteristics,
may vary greatly in their composition
and their environments. In particular,
externally-financed programmes in small
countries face challenges that differ from
those of self-funded programmes in
larger countries.
The CCTs in Honduras and Nicaragua—
respectively, the Programa de Asignación
Familiar (PRAF) and the Red de Protección
Social (RPS)—were two such programmes
funded by an external lending
institution. They faced obstacles that
manifested themselves in different
ways, but that stemmed from the
similar core challenges involved in
balancing the interests of internal
and external stakeholders.
PRAF was created by the Honduran
government in 1990 to compensate poor
Hondurans who had been adversely
affected by structural adjustment. The
best known version of the programme,
PRAF II, began in 1998 and was financed
by the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB). PRAF II was the first version of the
programme to have characteristics
common to CCTs. Earlier versions of PRAF
were CCTs in name rather than in
practice. PRAF II focused on human
capital accumulation among poor rural
Hondurans and supplemented the
incomes of beneficiary households.
Beneficiaries were obliged to send their
children to school, and to ensure that
they and their children had regular
medical check-ups.
PRAF also used supply-side
complements to encourage the
development of education and health
care services in targeted areas. An
impact evaluation conducted by the
International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) concluded that the
programme increased school enrolment
and attendance, as well as attendance
at regular medical check-ups, but that
poverty levels and nutritional intakes
had not improved greatly (IFPRI, 2003).
These results were partially attributed to
the low level of the cash transfers, which
amounted to less than 4 per cent of a
poor rural family’s annual expenditure
(IDB, 2004).
PRAF II ended in 2006 and another IDB
loan operation, here referred to as PRAF
III, began in 2007. A major goal of PRAF III
has been to standardize and integrate
the new, externally-financed version of
PRAF. Like PRAF II, the loan-funded PRAF
III runs alongside the nationally-funded
and directed PRAF.
Over time, two parallel programmes
have developed. The loan-financed
programme has complied with IDB
standards. The domestic version has
operated independently on the basis of
its own standards and goals. It provided
benefits to poor households but its
conditionalities were not enforced, and
thus practitioners and beneficiaries have
viewed it as an unconditional cash
transfer. Currently, officials are
attempting to integrate the two
Why Sources of
Funding for CCTs Matter
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programmes, and to make PRAF a central
component of the president’s network of
social protection policies.
Nicaragua’s RPS arose from a joint
undertaking of Nicaraguan officials and
the IDB. Similar in its components to the
Honduran programme, RPS focused on
poverty alleviation and human capital
accumulation among the extremely poor.
It required beneficiaries to ensure that
children attended school and received
health checks, and it encouraged supply-
side provision by compensating providers
of education and health services.
RPS also included a strong educational
component for beneficiaries in order to
encourage behavioural changes. IFPRI’s
evaluation of RPS found that it improved
education-related variables and
significantly improved nutritional
outcomes relative to a control group.
The impacts of RPS were greatest among
the poorest households. The transfers
represented about 18 per cent of a
typical beneficiary household’s
expenditures (Maluccio and Flores, 2004).
RPS officials made adjustments to the
programme and a second IDB loan phase
lasted from 2002 to 2004. The most
significant change in the second phase
was that the programme’s headquarters
moved from the Fondo de Inversión Social
de Emergencia (FISE) to the Family Ministry
(MiFamilia). The programme lost much of
its autonomy with the move to MiFamilia.
This change also forced RPS officials to
assume responsibilities outside of the
programme and to share resources with
other programmes. These developments
were the beginning of the end of RPS.
Although it was recognized internationally
for its success, domestic support for it
was weak and the loan programme was
not renewed after RPS II was completed.
A lending relationship was necessary
and helpful for both the Honduran and
Nicaraguan programmes. The IDB
provided invaluable guidance to
programme officials, encouraging
efficiency and effectiveness. In particular,
the loan-financed programmes were led
by technically capable and competent
individuals who held the initiatives
to high standards. This relationship,
however, also posed significant
challenges to PRAF and RPS, which had
to cater to both external and internal
stakeholders. The challenge was to
adhere to the lender’s stipulations
while aligning the programmes with
the countries’ long-term social
protection strategies.
PRAF and RPS officials were concerned
that their CCTs might be unduly
influenced by domestic pressures, and
they tried to leverage their institutional
structures in order to limit such
influences. PRAF II began after a
domestic programme had already been
established, and it created a completely
new space within which to operate.
It functioned separately from the
domestic PRAF, ensuring that it met
the IDB’s standards in hiring practices
and programme features.
This arrangement divided the
loan-financed CCT from the domestic
initiative, essentially creating two
programmes that shared little more
than a name. Integrating the
programmes required significant
time and financial resources.
RPS, created as a pilot programme, was
able to maintain relative independence
in its first loan phase because it was
located in a government agency known
for its efficiency. That agency’s focus was
unrelated to RPS, and thus it allowed
programme officials the autonomy they
needed. In the second loan phase, when
the Nicaraguan government wanted the
programme to fit into its proper position
within the Family Ministry, the
programme lost the independence that
had allowed it to function effectively.
According to their objectives, PRAF and
RPS were to focus on long-run human
capital accumulation, but the shortness
of the loan terms and deadlines directed
most attention to shortrun objectives.
When the RPS and PRAF loans ran their
course, it was not clear that that the
programmes had made long-term impacts.
This was especially true for PRAF, whose
cash transfers were small and infrequent.
The focus on long-term objectives
was even harder to maintain when
complications arose in programme
implementation, as happened in PRAF’s
case. This matter may be mitigated if the
CCT is designed to foster long-term
goals even if it faces difficulties or is
discontinued. For instance, long-term
behavioural changes among
beneficiaries were more likely in a
programme like RPS, which emphasized
the adult education component.
Another issue that merits attention is the
need to promote the programme to
domestic officials throughout the life
of the loan. PRAF officials have had to
justify PRAF’s existence continually
to government officers. Recent domestic
support has been a boon to the
programme. One of RPS’s weaknesses
is that officials were so busy trying to
implement the programme that they
spent insufficient time communicating
its success to domestic stakeholders.
Although RPS was internationally
renowned, Nicaraguan officials were
unaware of how the programme
operated or its accomplishments. Its
success was not enough to ensure its
sustainability; a strong public relations
campaign was also vital.
The challenges faced by Honduran and
Nicaraguan CCT officials were not
anomalies. They reveal some of the
pitfalls that countries may encounter
when they develop CCTs with the
support of external financing. This
lending relationship, though helpful in
many ways, poses additional challenges.
Policymakers must work to balance
the short- and long-term interests of
internal and external stakeholders in
order to create efficient and effective
programmes. These can eventually be
transformed into broader social
protection strategies.
IDB (2004). Programa Integral de Protección
Social, Propuesta de Préstamo (HO-0222).
Washington, DC, IDB.
IFPRI (2003). Sexto Informe. Proyecto
PRAF/BID Fase II: Impacto Intermedio.
Washington, DC, IFPRI.
Maluccio, J. and R. Flores (2004). “Impact
Evaluation of a Conditional Cash Transfer
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Health co-responsibilities
(“conditionalities”) might be
more difficult to enforce and
monitor than educational ones.
CCT programmes affect
decisions on time and
budgetary allocations in
favour of children, but it is
unclear whether these
changes stem from the
transfer itself or from other
programme components.
Households can be affected by
the mere existence of a social
programme and the presence
of other beneficiaries in their
community, whether
or not they themselves
are participating.
The Impact of CCTs
What We Know and
What We Are Not Sure About
Conditional cash transfer (CCT)
programmes are known for their double
objective of short run poverty alleviation
and breaking intergenerational poverty
in the long-term. The short run effects on
standard measures of poverty and
inequality are relatively easy to assess,
but it is quite difficult to determine
whether long-term objectives are being
met. Short- to medium-term evaluations
can only provide indications of whether
inputs that could lead to a break in the
intergenerational cycle of poverty, such
as higher school attendance, better
nutrition and higher health service
utilization, are being achieved
At the end of the 1990s, the rigorous
impact evaluation of the Mexican CCT
programme PROGRESA/Oportunidades,
conducted by the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), set a new
benchmark in how developmental policies
should be assessed. Its experimental
framework, which included the use of a
sound control group, allowed researchers
to develop consistent analyses of the
programme’s impacts. This approach was
replicated by IFPRI in evaluations of the
Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF II) in
Honduras and the Red de Protección Social
(RPS) in Nicaragua, and by the World Bank
in the evaluation of Bono de Desarrollo
Humano (BDH) in Ecuador.
Other countries have also carried
out impact analyses of their CCT
programmes. For instance, Familias en
Acción in Colombia evaluated by the
Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), Bolsa
Família in Brazil by the Center of
Development and Regional Planning
(Cedeplar), Program for the Advancement
Through Health and Education (PATH) in
Jamaica by Mathematica Policy Research
Inc and Tekoporã in Paraguay by the
International Poverty Centre (IPC).
But the design of these evaluations
was not experimental. They used “quasi-
experimental” techniques to estimate
the impacts of those programmes.
Impact evaluations usually assess both
the core objectives of CCT programmes
and possible unintended effects on
household behaviour. We already know
that these programmes have had positive
effects on both primary and secondary
school enrolment (increases of between
four and eighteen percentage points), as
well as on raising attendance rates and
reducing dropout rates.
Evaluation of PROGRESA, however, has also
yielded dismaying results in the area of
educational achievement; namely
beneficiary students have not got better
test scores than non-beneficiaries. Similarly,
the evaluation of Bolsa Família in Brazil has
shown that beneficiary children are almost
four percentage points more likely than
non-beneficiaries to fail at school. This
evidence raises concerns about the quality
of the schooling that beneficiary children
are receiving. A current challenge is to
determine how CCT programmes could
interact with other educational
programmes in order to improve school
quality and student performance.
With regard to child health and nutrition,
the results have not been so clear-cut. On
the one hand, evaluations of PROGRESA
Rafael Perez Ribas, Fábio Veras Soares
and Guilherme Issamu Hirata,
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and Familias en Acción indicate significant
reductions in the incidence of child
illness and improvements in child height.
In Mexico, the supply of nutritional
supplements for children might be the
main reason for this positive impact. In
Colombia, positive outcomes are
supported by effective enforcement of
the health check-up conditionality. In
contrast, Bolsa Família’s evaluation shows
no evidence of an impact on child
nutrition or immunisation. Although it
has raised the number of visits to health
centres, Paraguay’s pilot programme,
Tekoporã, has not managed to increase
immunisation either.
These results suggest that health
co-responsibilities (“conditionalities”)
might be more difficult to enforce and
monitor than educational ones, for two
reasons. First, in poor areas the service-
supply constraint is greater in health than
in education. The physical and human
resources required to keep a health centre
working normally pose more challenges
than those required by a school. Second,
households in poorer communities are
more reluctant to change their attitude
towards preventive health care than
towards school attendance.
Almost every programme evaluation
shows an increase in food acquisition.
But rising food consumption does not
necessarily imply an improvement in
nutrition, because this causal relationship
depends on other factors such as intra-
household allocation and bargaining, as
well as the quality of the diet. Both
PROGRESA and Familias en Acción have
increased food acquisition, along with
total household expenditure.
Nonetheless, only the PROGRESA has
affected household expenditure share,
as well as diet diversification. Other
programmes, such as Bolsa Família, BDH,
and PRAF II, have not increased total
expenditure. In the first two programmes,
however, there has been an increase in
consumption of food and child clothing
because of changes in the expenditure
share of those components.
It is clear that CCT programmes tend to
affect decisions on time and budgetary
allocations, mainly in favour of children.
Nonetheless, it is still unclear whether
these changes stem from income
increases caused by the transfer or from
other components of CCT programmes.
The fact that women receive the transfer
and that co-responsibilities are required
might affect household behaviour.
Many CCT programmes also have
complementary activities. These range
from informal talks on health and
hygiene, nutrition and budget planning
to the encouragement of productive
activities and social participation.
If impacts were mainly explained by the
relaxation of the budget constraint (which
allows families to plan their decisions in a
more forward-looking manner), then the
other components of CCT programmes
might represent an unnecessary cost.
But if the monetary transfers were not
enough to induce desired changes, other
components would be relevant. In this
case, the cash transfer would simply act
as an incentive to encourage families to
comply with the conditionalities and/or
to engage in complementary activities.
In Mexico, for instance, only 50 per cent
of PROGRESA’s diet diversification effect
was explained by the monetary transfer
(income effect). The remaining effect has
been attributed mainly to the talks on
health and nutrition.
Another important issue related to CCT
programmes is the role of externality
effects. Households can be affected by
the mere existence of a social
programme and the presence of other
beneficiaries in their community, whether
or not they themselves are participating.
The two most convincing examples of
externalities are the effects of general
equilibrium, which changes prices and
expectations in the economy, and social
interaction, which changes households’
preferences. Since externality may affect
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, this
effect can either lessen or heighten the
programme’s potential impact. For
obvious reasons, if this kind of effect is
not taken into account in designing an
evaluation, impact estimates may be
completely biased.
Recent studies on PROGRESA have shown
that ineligible households are also
affected by the programme. Non-
beneficiary households in areas where
the programme operated have also
increased their consumption because of
its effect on the local economy. Moreover,
the school enrolment rates of non-
eligible children have risen in districts
that took part in the programme due to
the so-called peer effect.
Similarly, the evaluation of Tekoporã
fielded two comparison groups,
within- and between-communities, to
disentangle the programme’s impact into
participation effect (being a beneficiary)
and externality effect (being in a
community where there are beneficiaries).
These effects were further decomposed
into “income effect” and  “other
programme components effect”
(see Figure).
The total impact on per capita
consumption has been negative, despite
the positive effect of both participation
components—income and other
programme features. The negative
result is completely due to the externality
effect, possibly derived from social
interactions among households. By the
same token, most of the total positive
effect on household saving is explained
by externality. Tekoporã, therefore, has
encouraged saving in rural areas and
consequently led to a reduction in total
household consumption.
Tekoporã also had a negative impact
on food share, mainly because of the
participation effect caused by other
programme components. The externality
effect has been positive but no income
effect was identified. On child-clothing
share, there have been neither income
nor externality effects. The positive
impact stems entirely from other
components of programme participation.
The main reason is that the programme
encourages households to spend money
in the best interest of their children,
since the conditionalities are mostly
related to child development.
All the components of CCT programmes
may have some effect on the desired
outcomes, but managers should know
which of them are more effective and
efficient for the purposes of meeting
programme goals, and through which
channels they work. Future impact
evaluations can shed some light on the
black-box of CCT programme impacts. 
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As the previous articles in this issue
of Poverty in Focus have discussed,
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have
become important tools for poverty
reduction policies in Latin America.
Impact evaluations have shown that
CCTs are efficient in promoting access to
public services and alleviating poverty
in the short-term. It might be too early,
however, to determine if their effect
on human capital will be enough to
stop the reproduction of poverty.
At the same time, there is a clear
need for better ex ante analysis that
takes account of specific national
circumstances and makes it possible
to tackle the tension arising from the
multiple objectives pursued by CCT
programmes (see the article by Karla
Parra Corrêa and Rafael Perez Ribas).
First, the managers of CCTs face the
challenge of prioritising the different
goals that the programmes seek to
meet. There are trade-offs between
poverty reduction in the short- and
medium term, and the increase in
human capital in the long-term. For
instance, if a programme targets those
segments of the population with low
rates of school attendance, the effects
on human capital might be greater than
if it had targeted poor families in
general. But the impact on poverty
would be less because large numbers
of the poor would not take part in the
programme. Conversely, if a programme
focuses solely on the (extremely) poor,
the transfers would go to children who
are already in school, which may not be
efficient in terms of the accumulation of
human capital.
Alternatively, poverty reduction could
be prioritised in the medium-term by
developing the productive capacity
of adult members of beneficiary
households. The human capital
objectives should be integrated with
complementary programmes and
activities that enable families to increase
their capacity to generate income.
Such a medium-term strategy would
allow families to graduate from the
programmes. But some tension would
arise between this approach and one
based on human capital accumulation,
since the latter may result in fewer
opportunities to build and/or
increase the productive capacity
of adult beneficiaries.
Another approach is to give priority to
the population affected by the greatest
overlap between poverty and a deficit
in human capital. This approach might
lead to an increase in transfers to
pre-school age children, minimising
the tension between human capital
accumulation and poverty relief.
It would also tackle poverty in the
short run because of the demographic
composition of the poorest homes.
Moreover, it would facilitate labour
market participation among poor
women, since it lowers the opportunity
cost associated with child care. With
regard to human capital accumulation,
it would cover the level of education
(pre-school) that has the greatest long-
term returns in human capital investment
and where the greatest asymmetries of
information are likely to be found.
In Latin America, however, pre-school
education has the lowest level of
coverage, a circumstance that highlights
the need for a careful assessment
of supply-side constraints.
Second, the problems that CCT
programmes aim to tackle are at least
partly caused by demand constraints.
Empirical evidence showing that most
vulnerable children use fewer health
by Pablo S. Villatoro,
Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) CCTs in Latin America:
Human Capital Accumulation
and Poverty Reduction1
There are trade-offs between
poverty reduction in the
short- and medium-term, and
the increase in human capital
in the long-term.
Interventions based on
demand incentives should be
undertaken when families are
forced to make suboptimal
decisions and when the
supply of services can meet
all the potential demand.
If a country’s social
protection strategy gives
priority to equity and rights,
and it does not regard the
labour market as the only
means of access to social
protection, a cash transfer
programme should
guarantee a minimum
income for the purposes
of social inclusion.
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and education services is not enough
to warrant the conclusion that an
intervention on the demand side will
solve the problem. Hence the need to
determine why there is limited use
of public services.
Poor school attainment, for instance,
may stem from the fact that families
underestimate the benefits of schooling
because of asymmetries of information
and/or because they face negative
economic shocks. In such cases, parents
prioritise the family’s immediate survival
over future returns from their children’s
education. Interventions based on
demand incentives should therefore be
undertaken when families are forced to
make suboptimal decisions and when
the supply of services can meet all the
potential demand.
Poor quality education and health
services, however, can seriously
compromise the impact of interventions.
In that event the line ministries will have
to develop initiatives to improve the
services, in close coordination with the
CCT programmes. In this context CCTs
do not replace or compete with health
and education programmes; in fact they
are complementary.
Third, the question of whether to
establish conditionalities poses a serious
dilemma. This controversial issue has
been at the heart of the discussion
about cash transfer programmes, for
four reasons: (i) there is a debate on the
rationale of using conditions; (ii) the
need to gain political support from the
middle class; (iii) the lack of conclusive
empirical evidence on the extra benefits
of conditioning; and (iv) the practical
difficulties of monitoring conditionalities.
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2004) argue
if underinvestment in human capital
is caused by market failures, income
effect (unconditional transfer) is
not enough to correct them: the
beneficiaries’ behaviour can be more
efficiently aligned with the social
interest by using conditionalities.
Similarly, Handa and Davis (2006)
suggest that it is unlikely that
unconditional transfers increase
demand, because of the low monetary
value of the benefit and the poor
quality of the services. But if the
aim is to alleviate poverty, using
conditionalities makes it harder to
achieve that aim, since they limit the
beneficiaries’ freedom of choice and
imposes extra costs.
If a programme uses conditionalities,
it should seek the most cost-effective
monitoring mechanisms. In fact,
implementing a system to monitor
compliance with conditionalities might
be a cumbersome task because of the
number of actors involved (beneficiaries,
service providers, programme agencies,
local government officials and so on).
The system may place an extra burden
on line ministries, mainly because of
the related technological requirements.
Additionally, many programmes already
use complex systems to select
beneficiaries, which can lessen the time
available for monitoring and for inter-
ministry coordination.
Another problem may be that both
local managers and beneficiaries have
incentives to report full compliance with
conditionalities. This behaviour may be
caused by unduly stringent supervision
mechanisms or by the need to keep the
transfers. A related issue is identifying
the appropriate conditionalities to have
the greatest impact.
Conditionalities on school attendance
might not make much sense in middle-
income countries whose indicators of
school access are good. For this reason,
it has been suggested that transfers
should be conditional on educational
achievement as a means of improving
learning outcomes (see the article by
Michelle Morais de Sa e Silva on New
York’s CCT programme).
Fourth, the graduation mechanism is
another hotly debated issue. It should
be kept in mind that the phasing-out
procedures used must be consistent
with each country’s social protection
strategy. For example, if a country’s
strategy gives priority to equity and
rights, and it does not regard the labour
market as the only means of access
to social protection, a cash transfer
programme should guarantee a
minimum income for the purposes
of social inclusion.
On the other hand, an approach that
focuses on the programme’s efficiency
might take account of budgetary
constraints and develop mechanisms to
minimise dependence. The question of
graduation is further complicated by the
multiple goals of the programmes and
the practical implementation issues that
affect them. These include the need to
include more families and maintain
political support, and the duration of
external credits when the programmes
are externally supported. Theses issues
are addressed in Charity Moore’s article
on Honduras and Nicaragua.
To reduce poverty in the short term,
cash transfer programmes would have
to impose time limits in order to obviate
dependence and graduate beneficiaries
who are no longer poor. A programme
that seeks to reduce poverty in the
medium-term requires complementary
policies that foster the adult
beneficiaries’ autonomous capacity
to generate income, as well as policies
that increase local demand for work.
Programmes that focus sharply on
building the human capital of children
and adolescents have to provide
transfers until the beneficiaries acquire
sufficient human capital to increase the
probability that they will escape poverty
in the future.
De Janvry, A. and E. Sadoulet (2004).
“Conditional Cash Transfer Programs:
Are They Really Magic Bullets?”, University
of California at Berkeley, Department of
Agricultural and Resource Economics
Website, <http://are.berkeley.edu/
~sadoulet/papers/ARE-CCTPrograms.pdf>.
Handa, S. and B. Davis (2006). “The
Experience of Conditional Cash Transfers
in Latin America and the Caribbean”,
Development Policy Review 24 (5), 513–536.
Villatoro, P. (2007). “Las transferencias
condicionadas en América Latina: luces y
sombras”, Economic Commission for Latin
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Department of Education and the
American Inequality Lab.
8,000 students from 60 schools throughout
the city have been chosen to participate.
They are either fourth or seventh graders.
“Students in the fourth grade will
receive up to $25 for a perfect score
on each of 10 interim assessment tests
taken throughout the year, up to a total of
$250”. “Seventh graders can earn up to $50
per test for a maximum payment of
$500 per year” (Seedco, 2007).
Family Rewards
Centre for Economic Opportunity, Seedco, MDRC, and selected
community-based organisations.
2,500 families living in Central and East Harlem (Manhattan), Brownsville
and East New York (Brooklyn), and Morris Heights/Mount Hope and East
Tremont/Belmont (the Bronx).
The success of an incentives-
based programme such as
Opportunity NYC depends
partly on how well
beneficiaries understand
how it operates, so that
they can respond to its
incentives as expected.
The programme does not
intend to alter the governance
structure of the school
system, nor  does it involve
innovative pedagogies or new
classroom teaching practices.
It simply assumes that,
by giving students monetary
incentives, it will bring about
improvements in test scores.
During a recent public speech at
Teachers College, the Chancellor of New
York City’s Department of Education, Joel
Klein, revealed that his department has
sought to embrace every educational
experiment that seems promising.
Indeed, New York City, home to the
largest school system in the United
States, has witnessed the establishment
of a very innovative and also controversial
experiment: Opportunity New York City.
Currently, the programme is being
implemented as a two-year pilot, to be
funded entirely by private donors, with a
total budget of more than US$50 million.
Why should attention be paid to such a
new programme? The reasons can be
found in three of its very interesting
features: the complexity of its incentive
structure; the strategy used by the city’s
mayor to try to bypass opposition; and
the implications it may have for education
reforms and other conditional cash transfer
(CCT) programmes around the world.
Opportunity NYC comprises three sub-
programmes: (i) Opportunity NYC Family
Rewards; (ii) Opportunity NYC Work; and
(iii) Opportunity NYC Spark. The latter is
the programme’s main educational
component and is being managed
separately by the city’s Department
of Education (see Figure).
Opportunity NYC Family Rewards also
involves a number of cash incentives
related to school attendance and
academic performance. To be eligible,
beneficiaries must: (i) have at least one
child entering fourth, seventh or ninth
grade in a New York City public school in
September 2007; (ii) have a family income
of less than 130 per cent of the federal
poverty level; (iii) have at least one parent
who is a US citizen or permanent legal
resident; (iv) live in one of the designated
community districts (Opportunity NYC,
2008). The Table presents a comparison
of Spark and Family Rewards, and draws
attention to the different conditions and
rewards attached to educational activities.
The two sub-components of Opportunity
NYC also differ in the way targeting and
registrations were carried out. Spark’s
by Michelle Morais de Sa e Silva,
International Poverty Centre
and Columbia University Opportunity NYC:
A Controversial Cash
Transfer in the North
Condition
95 percent school attendance
per month
Attending parent-teacher conferences
Obtaining a library card
Improvement in scores or proficiency
on standardised tests at the elementary
and middle school levels
Passing grade on individual Regents
exams for high school completion
Parental review of the test and
discussion with teachers
Reward
$25 per month (elementary
and middle school students)
$50 per month (high school students)
$25
$50
$300 per test (elementary school)
$350 per test (middle school)
$600
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targeting was at the school and grade
levels. Sixty low-performing schools were
chosen and, within them, all students
enrolled in fourth and seventh grades.
In contrast, targeting for Family Rewards
was initially at the community district
level. The six poorest community districts
in the city’s five boroughs were chosen:
two in Harlem (Manhattan), two in
Brooklyn and two in the Bronx. Charities
and community organisations operating
in each of those districts were then
contracted in order to locate and contact
families that met the eligibility criteria.
The family “search process” started with
information from the Department of
Education on children enrolled in the
eligible grades (fourth, seventh and ninth)
who received free or reduced-price lunch
(eligibility for which is commonly used as
a proxy for poverty in the United States).
With that information in hand, the
contracted organisations began looking
for eligible families in order to complete
their applications for admission to the
programme. Each organisation was
responsible for at least 850 family
applications. From the total applicant
pool, beneficiary families were selected
through a lottery.
Understanding how these two sub-
programmes differ in their operation but
overlap in purpose is fundamental to an
analysis of how likely they are to secure
the public support necessary for the
scheme to endure and expand in the
future. It can be argued that the success
of an incentives-based programme like
Opportunity NYC depends partly on how
well the beneficiaries understand how it
operates, so that they can respond to its
incentives as expected. In this case,
however, the existence of two education-
related schemes (Spark and Family
Rewards) may cause confusion and have
suboptimal results—not to mention the
complexity within each sub-programme,
which offer different cash amounts for
an array of activities and performance
improvements (see Table).
A second interesting feature of
Opportunity NYC is that, since it is a
privately funded initiative, political
acquiescence and legislative approval
were not needed. In the first pilot phase
no public deliberation took place,
since taxpayers are not funding the
programme. As regards sustainability,
however, what will happen when the
initial budget of US$50 million has
been spent? Currently, both conservatives
and liberals, as well as most teachers,
oppose the programme in principle.
Only some very positive evidence from
its impact evaluation may be able to
counter such resistance.
In any case, it should be remembered
that besides the political lobbying that
teachers can undertake through their
unions, there are various ways in which
they can exhibit their opposition in their
own classrooms. For instance, they can
refuse to provide beneficiary students
with the extra teaching support they
need in order to gain better grades and
receive cash rewards.
Additionally, what would be the future
implications of a successful Opportunity
NYC? Note that the programme does not
intend to alter the governance structure
of the school system, nor does it involve
innovative pedagogies or new classroom
teaching practices. It simply assumes that,
by giving students monetary incentives,
it will bring about the improvements in
test scores that educational policymakers
have wanted for so long. Given the
influence of positive evaluation results,
therefore, and frustration in the United
States with past education reforms, there
are reasons to believe that if Opportunity
NYC succeeds it may induce a change in
the focus of education policies. Concern
may shift from improving teacher quality
and accountability to raising demand by
buying student motivation and effort.
Those repercussions may spread beyond
New York City, “contaminating” not only
other US cities and states but also CCTs
in the developing world. Unfortunately,
more often than not, programmes and
policies are transferred from one
country to another for political and
economic reasons, frequently with
disregard for their suitability to the
new contexts in which they will be
implemented (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004).
Countries should therefore be wary:
much prior scrutiny and accompanying
supply-side measures are needed before
performance-based conditionalities can
be introduced. Betting on cash rewards
for academic performance, without
assuring access and quality, can be a
true waste of public money. 




(accessed 8 January 2008).
Seedco (2007). “Mayor Bloomberg Releases
Incentives Schedule for Opportunity NYC,
Aimed at Helping New Yorkers Break the
Cycle of Poverty” . Seedco Website,
<http://www.seedco.org/newsreleases/
newsrelease.php?id=49>
(accessed 20 November 2007).
Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2004). The Global
Politics of Educational Borrowing and
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Social cash transfers (SCTs) are
relatively new social protection
instruments in East and Southern Africa
(ESA). In the HIV and AIDS policy dialogue
in particular, the “protective” dimension
of programming increasingly calls for the
use of SCTs to support families that care
for orphans and other children affected
by AIDS (UNICEF and UNAIDS, 2004). AIDS
experts advocate such programmes
because AIDS is the leading cause of
prime-age mortality in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) and the region has 25–30
million orphans, a third of whom have
lost a parent to the disease.
AIDS-related prime-age adult mortality
has caused a dramatic decline in life
expectancy rates in the region, and has
severely weakened family support
systems already stretched thin by extreme
chronic poverty. In this context, SCTs are
increasingly being demanded as AIDS-
mitigation measures, to help families
cope with growing dependency ratios
and the associated burden of care, and
to protect the health and human capital
development of orphans in particular.
The largest cash transfer programme for
children in ESA is South Africa’s national
child support grant, which reaches more
than 9 million children. Several countries
have smaller programmes, either
demonstrations (Kenya, Malawi, Zambia),
or established programmes with low
coverage (Mozambique). Lesotho is
currently designing a SCT that targets
orphans and vulnerable children, while
both Botswana and Namibia have either
in-kind or cash assistance programmes
for families that care for orphans.
Several other countries are currently
considering SCTs on a trial basis,
including Angola, Rwanda, Tanzania,
and Uganda. Such programmes,
therefore, are very much part of
the social policy dialogue in ESA.
As momentum gathers around SCTs in
ESA, there are many technical questions
about programme design parameters
such as targeting, transfer levels and
overall affordability. As regards orphans,
an important policy question is how to
expand such programmes so that they
reach the children most in need of
assistance. Should governments explicitly
target households with orphans for
receipt of cash assistance? Or should
the programmes focus more broadly
on poverty as the key underlying
determinant of vulnerability?
To answer these questions, we use
micro-simulations to determine
who would be reached under
different targeting schemes in terms
of demographics and poverty, using
household surveys from selected
coutnries. The schemes analysed
are stylised versions of those currently
operating in ESA: (i) labour-constrained
households (Malawi, Zambia);
(ii) households with elderly or disabled
members (Mozambique); (iii) households
with orphans (Botswana); and
(iv) households with children (Kenya).
A fixed budget of 0.5 per cent of GDP,
with 20 per cent administrative costs,
is used. A flat transfer of 30 per cent of
by Sudhanshu Handa,
UNICEF Regional Office for Eastern and
Southern Africa and Scott Stewart,




children has a greater impact
on school enrolment than
other targeting strategies.
The experience of four
countries in Southern Africa
demonstrates that an orphan-
targeting approach reaches
more orphans but excludes
many of the poorest children,
since orphans are not
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median consumption of the bottom
quintile in each country is provided.
A subset of these results, focusing on
Malawi and Uganda, is shown in Figures
1 and 2. These usefully illustrate the
policy trade-off faced by governments
in ESA as they seek to protect the most
vulnerable children through targeted
SCTs. The first two bars in each cluster
show the percentage of all children and
all orphans reached in the poorest decile.
The last two bars show these same
percentages for the lowest three deciles.
In general, more children of any kind are
reached by either the child- or orphan-
centred scheme in the two countries
shown, particularly children in the
poorest consumption decile. In both
countries the orphan scheme reaches all
orphans in the bottom decile, but fewer
children in that decile. In Malawi, for
example, the orphan scheme reaches
only about 25 per cent of children in
the poorest decile, as it does in Uganda.
This illustrates the potential trade-off
in targeting poor families with children
versus those with orphans only.
The trade-off becomes less clear when all
children in the bottom three deciles are
considered. In Uganda, for instance, if the
bottom three deciles are taken together,
then the “coverage” of the orphan scheme
among all children is about the same as
the child-focused scheme—but the
coverage of orphans is significantly higher.
The same is true in Malawi: the coverage
among all children in the bottom three
deciles is about the same in both schemes,
but the coverage of orphans is higher in
the orphan-focused scheme.
Hence it is only when the focus is on
the ultra-poorest children—those in the
bottom decile—that the distinction
between the two schemes (child-focused
versus orphan-focused) becomes
apparent. If policymakers give greater
weight to this group, and if good
targeting is possible, then the scheme that
favours children over orphans will reach
more children in the poorest decile
relative to an orphan-targeted scheme.
Such a scheme would also reach about 50
per cent of orphans in the bottom decile.
In all four countries, the proportional
gain in per capita consumption among
recipient households is higher for
strategies that target children explicitly,
as compared to strategies that target
labour-constrained, age- and disability-
vulnerable or orphan households.
In Malawi, for example, the increase in
recipients’ consumption is 40 per cent for
the orphan scheme but 48 per cent for
the child-focused scheme; in Uganda the
corresponding figures are 34 and 48 per
cent, respectively.
This underscores the fact that the child-
focused scheme connects with poorer
households, suggesting that orphans are
not necessarily clustered in the bottom
consumption decile. Similar results are
obtained when the squared poverty gap
(SPG) is analysed—this is the poverty
indicator that is most sensitive to changes
in welfare among the very poorest. In all
four countries the greatest improvements
in SPG are brought about by strategies that
target households with children, while
strategies that target labour-constrained
households have the least effect.
Simulations of the impact of SCTs on
school enrolment were also estimated
with these data, using a probit model
to estimate the relationship between
expenditure and schooling, and including
standard control variables such as the
education of the household head, the age
and sex of the child, region of residence
and distance to the nearest school. The
estimates were made for the target
population—the bottom three deciles of
the consumption distribution—in order
to obtain relevant behavioural responses.
In all countries, a comparison of the
estimated impact across targeting
strategies indicates that reaching
households with children has a greater
impact on school enrolment than other
strategies. In Malawi, for example,
targeting households with children
yields an increase in enrolment of five
percentage points among children aged
6–17, while targeting households with
orphans yields an increase of 4.2 points.
Other schemes yield lower increases in
school attendance because they reach
fewer children, and those they do reach
are relatively affluent.
SCTs in ESA that target households with
orphans reach the highest number of
orphans, but they include households
in the third consumption decile while
excluding many of the poorest children
living in the bottom two deciles.
Targeting poor families with children,
however, leads to a greater concentration
of resources among the very poorest
households and the highest coverage
of children in the bottom decile. This
highlights the key dilemma faced by
policymakers in a context where social
protection is driven by the HIV and
AIDS-mitigation agenda. There is a trade-
off between pure poverty targeting, or
targeting poor households with children,
and targeting households with orphans.
This trade-off is particularly important
when the focus is on the ultra-poorest
households—those in the bottom
consumption decile.  
Schubert, B. (2007). The Impact of Social
Cash Transfers on Children affected by HIV
and AIDS. Nairobi, UNICEF-ESARO.
UNICEF and UNAIDS (2004). The Framework
for the Protection, Care and Support of
Orphans and Vulnerable Children Living
in a World with HIV and AIDS. New York,
UNICEF/UNAIDS.20 International Poverty Centre
The legal basis of the transfer
scheme is not strong enough
for citizens to claim their
entitlements, and current
funding levels would have








funding for such programmes.
Social assistance programmes
are the first to be trimmed in
the event of budgetary
difficulties, and active
advocacy is crucial to
sustaining them.
by Esther Schuering,
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) Social Cash Transfers
in Zambia:
A Work in Progress
Zambia was one of the first country
to try social cash transfers. This was a
novelty in a country where other forms
of support were erratic and irregular.
There were questions about the
implementing agency, the Ministry
of Community Development and Social
Services (MCDSS). The ministry has neither
a large pool of experienced and trained
officers nor the political influence to
effect greater policy changes. All these
uncertainties made piloting seem the
obvious choice. Piloting would allow a
radical approach to be tested; evidence
could be collected; policymakers,
implementers and the public could be
sensitised; and implementing capacity
and structures could come under scrutiny.
Now, four years after the Kalomo
Social Cash Transfer Scheme was
officially launched, it is time to
assess whether it has been merely an
interesting learning experience for social
assistance programming or whether it will
continue as a nationwide programme.
Trial and Error: The social cash transfer
scheme was set up in Kalomo district
towards the end of 2003 as an
intervention aimed at households
affected by HIV/AIDS and to make the
support provided through the Public
Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) more
cost-effective. The first results of the
test were promising. The scheme was
officially launched in May 2004 and
then extended to the rest of the district.
The constant adjustments to the Kalomo
scheme were necessary, but they also
posed a challenge for the MCDSS. The
Ministry’s structures and capacities, as
well as its lack of performance-based
incentives, were not conducive to the
effective management of the programme.
Mini-pilot initiatives for a performance-
based incentives scheme, a management
information system, and various
training programmes were meant
to strengthen these rather fragile
management structures.
The Quest for Impact: The first impact
evaluation of Kalomo allowed
preliminary conclusions on how
household conditions had changed.
Of particular note were:
 higher satiation levels after meals
(households still hungry after each
meal decreased from 56.3 per cent
to 34.8 per cent);
 greater variety in food intake
(more households consuming
vitamins and proteins in the form
of vegetables, fruit, fish and meat);
 reduced incidence of sickness
(from 42.8 per cent to 35 per cent);
 increase in asset ownership
(ownership of goats increased
from 8.5 per cent of households
to 41.7 per cent); and
 enterprising attitude (four times more
households investing, and a doubling
of the amounts invested).
The first impact evaluation lacked a
control group, which proved particularly
problematic during the drought year of
the assessment. A second evaluation was
therefore commissioned to secure better
 Cash Transfer Pilots in Five Districts: Reviewing Policy Options
Kalomo Capacity requirements for implementation at local, district, provincial
and national level.
Development of training modules and planning tools to extend the
social cash transfer scheme to other districts.
Combination of the regular PWAS and cash transfers.
Kazungula Retargeting and graduation mechanism.
Implementation in a remote and sparsely populated district.
Monze Soft conditionality in health and education.
Implementation of the social cash transfer without direct
technical assistance.
Chipata Urban transfers: expansion requirements and governance issues
Transfer value (school bonus).
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Social Cash Transfer Scheme in Zambia
Implementing institution: Ministry of Community Development and Social Services.
Target group: Option 1: households that are destitute (no regular
external support, no productive valuable assets,
no substantive income) or incapacitated (more than
three dependents for every productive member).
Option 2: elderly above the age of 60,
possibly means-tested in the future.
Targeting system: Community-based targeting with checks
and balances.
Payment system: Pay points operated at schools or health centres by
government workers.
Transfer amount: Option 1: US$10 per household, US$2.5 for children,
paid bimonthly.
Option 2: US$15 per pensioner.
Monitoring: Decentralised internal monitoring system.
Evaluation: At present, two impact evaluations
(Kalomo 07 and Kalomo/ Kazungula/Chipata 08).
Third evaluation (Monze) imminent. Additionally,
analysis of design features such as targeting, payment,
management and conditionalities.
data. But most impacts are long-term in
programmes like this and will only become
apparent over the medium and long run.
At the same time, impact evaluations
from comparable programmes, such as
in Malawi, may legitimately be used to
support arguments in favour of such
interventions. Hence research does not
stop at the country’s border.
Analysing Policy Options: The pilot
region now includes five districts,
and Zambia is currently examining the
different needs of a peri-urban scheme.
The plan is to review different targeting
mechanisms (community-based
targeting versus a universal old-age
pension scheme), explore distribution
mechanisms other than the pay-point
system (such as smart cards and
mobile banking), and determine if
soft conditionalities are an added value.
The different pilots are meant to inform
the design of a national scheme, which the
MCDSS envisages for this year.
Institutionalisation: The danger of any
pilot scheme is that it is an isolated
solution that is not well integrated into
existing systems and overall policies.
Usually, pilot schemes do not have a legal
basis. In Zambia, social cash transfers are
rooted in the social protection strategy
and the national development plan, and
they are also mentioned in social welfare
and social security policies. The MCDSS
has even created a separate budget line
for them. Hence there is awareness that
social cash transfers cannot be stand-
alone efforts.
Additionally, the first attempts have been
made to merge social cash transfers with
other social assistance initiatives
managed by the Ministry, and to
examine complementary programmes.
But the legal basis is not strong enough
for citizens to claim their entitlements,
and the funds currently provided
would have to increase dramatically
for a national programme to be
established (more than twice the
Ministry’s present budget would be
needed for a national programme).
Political Will in Slow Motion: While the
MCDSS has become an active advocate
for social cash transfers, the Ministry
of Finance has not yet authorised a
national programme. Poverty reduction
is still supposed to be a consequence
of growth, and social programming
stresses early graduation rather than
effective poverty alleviation.
Civil society has tried to enter into a
dialogue with the Ministry of Finance,
but it struggles to make its voice heard
and to induce a re-thinking. The
situation is further complicated because
politics in Zambia is sometimes
personalised. This is especially true
if individual actors with substantial
decision-making power do not favour the
programme irrespective of its results.
Although social assistance is part of the
national development plan and social
welfare policy, the government is not
required to honour its obligations.
It can be assumed that social assistance
programmes are the first to be trimmed
in the event of budgetary difficulties.
Active advocacy, involvement of members
of parliament and the constitutional
review commission, will help sustain the
programme. Further cooperation with civil
society and dialogue with the Ministry of
Finance are all part of an effort to
generate the necessary political will.
Time to Expand? The MCDSS is currently
organising a review in order to take a
critical look at all the lessons learned.
While it is always tempting to continue
at a small scale. A decision to continue
the pilot phase can also lead to an
eternal pilot. What is needed is for the
MCDSS, on the basis of research and
evaluation, to drive the process further.
Support from civil society and the
media can help raise interest among
parliamentarians, who may make a
case for social cash transfers for the
purposes of their political agenda.
There is a window of opportunity to
engage in an effective dialogue with
the Ministry of Finance.
It is also important to keep in mind that
the end of a pilot does not mean the end
of lesson-learning. Since any expansion
of the programme would be gradual,
there would still be ample room to make
adjustments to its design. In Zambia, the
decision on expansion now hinges on the
capacity of the MCDSS to take advantage
of this window of opportunity in order to
create more political, institutional and
fiscal space by means of the appropriate
strategy in the areas of advocacy,
communication and capacity building.
References for this article are found at:
<www.socialcashtransfers-zambia.org>.22 International Poverty Centre
Social pensions are designed to
address old-age poverty. They are non-
contributory cash benefits paid to older
people, either universally or sometimes
subject to a means test. Botswana,
Lesotho, Mauritius and Namibia pay
universal pensions. South Africa
provides a means-tested pension but
has begun a process that is likely to lead
to the elimination of this cumbersome
targeting mechanism. There is an
emerging consensus in Southern Africa
that social pensions should be universal.
A growing body of evidence in several
Southern African countries demonstrates
that social pensions not only tackle
poverty broadly but also contribute to
pro-poor economic growth. Research
shows that social pensions in these
countries reduce hunger and extreme
poverty while improving health care,
education and gender equality.
Household survey evidence reveals
that older people in Africa are often
disproportionately poorer than the rest of
the population. In 1997, for example, the
poverty rate for older persons in Kenya
was nearly 50 per cent, compared to 45
per cent for the population as a whole.
The severity and depth of poverty are
also often higher among the elderly.
The social pension in South Africa
reduces the country’s overall poverty gap
by 21 per cent, and by 54 per cent for
households with older people.
The pension virtually eliminates the
poverty gap for households with only
older members—a reduction of 98 per
cent. In Mauritius, the share of older-
people households below the poverty
line is 64 per cent without the social
pension, but only 19 per cent with it.
Income poverty is significantly reduced
across all age groups.
Simulation results for African countries
show that a social pension would reduce
the poverty rate for older people by 13
per cent to 19 per cent. Social pensions,
especially if indexed to inflation, can play
a critical role in cushioning the poor
against rapid increases in the price of
basic commodities, particularly food.
Additionally, an emerging evidence
base from Africa reveals several channels
through which social pensions contribute
to economic growth. First, social pensions
mobilise one of the most under-used
resources in many developing countries:
the skills of older people in allocating
household resources. Extensive studies
have documented how social pensions
increase human capital investment for
children, particularly in terms of nutrition,
health and education. Second, social
pensions relax household liquidity
constraints and contribute to investment.
Third, these regular income transfers
provide a mechanism that helps
households to manage social risk,
encouraging productive behaviour—
particularly labour market participation.
Fourth, in many countries, social
pensions foster changes in spending
patterns that reinforce economic growth.
Fifth, social pensions enhance social
cohesion and political stability.
While social pensions directly target
poor older people, many of the resources
support human capital development for
children and help them grow into more
productive adults. In South Africa,
children in households that receive the
social pension are more likely to attend
school and succeed academically than
children in similar households that do
not receive the grants. Children
(particularly girls) in households
receiving pension payments are also
more likely to have better health and
nutrition indicators. Social pensions
provide critical support for the increasing
number of older persons acting as
primary caregivers for orphans and
other vulnerable children, a demographic
change exacerbated by HIV and AIDS.
In South Africa, children in
households that receive the
social pension are more likely
to attend school and succeed
academically than children in
similar households that do
not receive the grants.
Social pensions provide the
regular income security that
households need to manage
social risk and invest in high-
return activities
The social pensions in
Botswana and Namibia
absorb 0.4 percent of GDP
and 0.7 percent of GDP
respectively. Simulation
results show that Kenya can
provide a social pension to all
persons aged 55 and above
for 1 per cent of GDP.
by Michael Samson
and Sheshangai Kaniki,
Economic Policy Research Institute Social Pensions as
Developmental Social
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Sixty per cent of pensioners in Lesotho
care for children who are studying at
school or college. Pension money is used
to buy uniforms, books and stationery.
The pension in Lesotho is also important
for the nutrition status of recipient
households. Before receiving the pension,
one in five recipients responded that
they never had enough food to satisfy
their hunger. This dropped to one in ten
following the introduction of the social
pension, while the proportion always
having enough food rose from 36 per
cent to 46 per cent.
Social pensions provide the regular
income security that households need
to manage social risk and invest in high-
return activities. Some older people in
Namibia, for example, use their social
pension to invest in livestock and other
agricultural activities. In South Africa,
the social pension supports access to
credit, funds the renting of capital
equipment, and finances inputs for
agricultural activities.
Social pensions reduce the downside
risk of job search and also relax liquidity
constraints. They enable workers to
invest in more productive job search,
providing the critical support they
need to look for decent work and
avoid attaching themselves to the worst
forms of labour. They allow the poorest
households to avoid less efficient
insurance mechanisms and improve
employment prospects by reducing the
risk and cost of job search. These grants
also directly support productivity-
enhancing expenditures such as
nutrition and access to transport services.
South African households receiving
social pensions and other transfers are
more likely to participate in the labour
force and have more success in securing
employment. This impact is significantly
greater for women in the poorest
households. The old-age pension in
South Africa is also associated with a
reduction in child labour, since children
do not need to work and they receive
educational support. Twenty-one per
cent of social pension recipients in
Lesotho spent part of their grant income
creating jobs, ranging from general
household chores to farm work.
Social pensions help finance women’s
migration for job search and help older
people care for the workers’ children,
leading to positive and significant
employment impacts for female labour
migrants. These results corroborate earlier
studies showing positive labour market
impacts, and indicate that social pensions
provide crucial resources for job search.
Social pensions can stimulate demand
for local goods and services. In South
Africa, social pensions shift the
composition of national expenditure
from imports to local goods, increasing
savings and economic growth. In Namibia,
the  spending power created by social
pensions supports the development
of local markets and revitalises local
economic activity. As one Namibian
observed, “the wheels of the local
economy begin to turn on pension day”.
In the middle of the last century,
Mauritius had a vulnerable mono-crop
economy and high poverty rates. Today,
it has the lowest poverty rate in Africa.
An International Monetary Fund report,
“Who Can Explain the Mauritian
Miracle?”, recognises a number of inter-
related reasons for this, including the
social pension established in 1950 that
helped create the social cohesion
needed to restructure the economy
onto a high-growth path.
Similarly, Botswana’s social pension is the
government’s most effective mechanism
for tackling poverty and supporting the
social stability that has encouraged the
high investment rates required to drive
Africa’s fastest-growing economy over
the past three decades. The national cash
transfers system in South Africa (of which
the social pension is a major component)
significantly reduced inequality, lowering
the Gini coefficient from 0.80 to 0.73.
Governments can design social pensions
in line with available fiscal resources.
The size of the transfer and the eligibility
age are two variables that can be
calibrated to ensure affordability.
The social pensions in Botswana and
Namibia absorb 0.4 per cent of GDP
and 0.7 per cent of GDP, respectively.
Simulation results show that Kenya can
provide a social pension to all persons
aged 55 and above for 1 per cent of GDP.
Evidence from Southern Africa
demonstrates that social pensions
constitute the governments’ most
effective poverty-reducing intervention.
They are also an affordable investment
in pro-poor economic growth and a
starting point for an effective
and comprehensive system of
developmental social security. 
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Many African governments
allocate less than 1 per cent
of GDP for pensions, other
cash transfers and in-kind
social assistance.
A basic social security
package is demonstrably
affordable in Africa, but
its implementation requires a
joint effort by the countries
and the international
donor community.
The Case for Basic Social Security
We know that social security is a
declared human right. It is accepted
as part of an international labour
standard. We know from worldwide
experience, both historical and current,
that social security is a powerful tool
not only to alleviate poverty, but also
to reduce inequality (ILO, 2008a).
The experience of all developed market
economies has proved that social
security is an indispensable part
of any efficient market economy.
Countries in Africa urgently need to
develop and put in place basic social
security provisions.
How Much Would It Cost?
Many studies have analysed the possible
costs of a basic social security package
for low-income countries, including
those in Africa. For example, a recent
study by the International Labour Office
(ILO, 2008a) looked at the costs of basic
package consisting of:
 universal access to essential health
care services;
 universal, basic old-age and
disability pension;
 basic child benefits for the first
two children; and
 basic social assistance providing a
100-day employment guarantee to
the poorest 10 per cent of household
heads of working age.
As Figure 1 shows, the non-health part
of the package would cost (in expected
2010 demographic and economic
conditions) between 3 and nearly 6 per
cent of GDP. Financing universal access
to essential heath care would require
additional resources: between 1.5 per
cent of GDP (Guinea) and 5.5 per cent
(Burkina Faso).
The cost of the whole package would be
between 5 and 10 ten per cent of GDP,
depending on a country’s particular
conditions. Another ILO study
(ILO, 2008b), conducted as a part of
the social protection expenditure and
performance review in Zambia, analysed
the cost of a similar package of
hypothetical cash benefits (but with the
child benefit limited to the first child,
and thus much less costly). It showed
that in the longer run it would cost no
more than 1.5 per cent of GDP, excluding
administrative costs.
A similar exercise for Tanzania
(ILO, forthcoming) put the costs for
the same package at a little more than
1.8 per cent of GDP.
by Krzysztof Hagemejer,
ILO Social Security Department,
Geneva Can African Countries
Afford Basic
Social Security?
Can They Afford Not To Have It?
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How Can the Necessary Resources
be Found?
The total government spending
(including social security funds)
of lower-income countries in sub-
Saharan Africa is 25–30 per cent of GDP.
Most of these countries, however,
allocate a very small percentage of
the available domestic and external
resources to financing the provision
of social security.
Many countries allocate less than
1 per cent of GDP for cash transfers
and in-kind social assistance. All but a
few governments allocate less than
2 per cent of GDP (Figure 2).
Even if a larger portion of the total
available public resources is allocated to
social security benefits in some of these
countries, most of the benefits reach
only a small part of the population—in
most cases, only government employees
and those in the private sector who
have regular contractual employment.
Virtually none of the benefits go to
the majorities, those working in
subsistence agriculture and the urban
poor. In Zambia and Tanzania, for
example, governments and donors
allocate the equivalent of less than
0.2 per cent of GDP to all current social
assistance programmes.
Even with current resources, there is
a potential fiscal space to provide the
financing necessary to build up basic
social security systems and gradually
reach all of those in need. But achieving
that would require shifts in the current
allocations of budgetary resources.
This requires:
 Rationalising existing social
programmes, by making them less
costly and/or more effective in
meeting poverty reduction goals—
that is, integrating or coordinating
current social assistance or social
insurance programmes to avoid
overlap and waste; cutting
administrative costs in existing
contributory pension programmes;
and improving design and overall
governance.
 Reassessing all current government
spending programmes to determine
whether they serve the broader
policy objectives of reduced poverty
and inequality (for example, is there
sufficient economic justification for
fuel subsidies, which are “cash” transfers
to the rich?).
Most Sub-Saharan African countries
increased domestic revenue on average
from 15 per cent of GDP in 1997 to 19
per cent in 2006, mainly through more
effective tax collection. The tax base will
have to be significantly broadened and
tax systems will have to be reviewed and
modified, in order to secure the
maximum resources.
The Way Forward
As countries attain higher levels of
economic development, their social
security systems can advance in parallel,
extending the scope, level and quality
of the benefits and services provided.
A basic social security package is
demonstrably affordable, but its
implementation requires a joint effort:
the low-income countries would have to
reallocate existing resources and raise
new ones, and the international donor
community would have to refocus
international grants on direct financing
of social protection benefits, on
strengthening the administrative
and delivery capacity of national social
protection institutions, and on providing
the necessary technical advice.
Several low-income countries in Africa
and elsewhere have started to take these
steps (recent developments in countries
such as Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania
and Zambia are just a few examples), and
there are signs that the process will
accelerate in the near future.
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“Can Low-Income Countries Afford Basic
Social Security?” , Social Security Policy
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ILO Social Security Department (2008b).
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Performance Review and Social Budget.
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by Karla Parra Corrêa
and Rafael Perez Ribas,
International Poverty Centre Needs Assessments:
Why They Are Important for
CCT Programmes
Needs assessments
are valuable tools for
planning and managing
CCT programmes.
A needs assessment would
reveal whether, when sending
their children to school, poor
households face costs related
to forgone domestic or other
economic activities.
A comprehensive needs
assessment based on school
data can help the different
needs to be placed in priority
order, so as to ensure better
planning and more effective
allocation of resources.
As the previous articles have shown,
conditional cash transfer (CCT)
programmes ensure that poor
households have a minimum level of
income, and thus such initiatives can be
effective in alleviating poverty. Moreover,
the existence of conditionalities
introduces direct links between impacts
on income poverty and results in other
areas, such as education and health.
CCT programmes, however, might
not always meet their stated goals.
In some circumstances their design and
implementation might not be properly
tailored to local social, economic
and institutional conditions. In order
to address those conditions more
effectively, ex ante assessments of
gaps and needs are crucial.
Needs assessments are meant to provide
empirical evidence on the state of access
to social services, institutional capacities
to administer the programmes and their
affordability. Policymakers can then
evaluate the relevance and feasibility
of programmes before they are
implemented. Needs assessments
are valuable tools for planning and
managing CCT programmes.
A needs assessment seeks to measure
the extent and nature of a particular
population’s needs and the services that
are required. When identifying shortfalls
in access to basic services, evidence of
the profile of the population excluded
from a service and the reasons for the
exclusion should be highlighted.
Sectoral analyses, for instance, can
identify whether access to social services
is at a desired level or if there is any
shortfall. Such analyses provide
programme designers with information
on access constraints and on which
improvements are required. For example,
a CCT programme might aim to improve
prenatal care among poor women. But if
almost every pregnant woman regularly
uses such a service, that programme
component will not be relevant.
A needs assessment may reveal that
poor school attendance could be due to
both demand and supply factors. On the
demand side, household income and
family background are the most
significant determinants of schooling.
The poorer and less educated the
parents in a household, the higher
the opportunity cost of putting their
children in school.
Even when education services are
accessible and affordable, household
decisions about child schooling are made
according to the immediate cost and the
expected longrun return. A needs
assessment would reveal whether, when
sending their children to school, poor
households face costs related to forgone
domestic or other economic activities.
Needs assessments can also offer
ex ante evidence of how an increase
in household resources affect school
attendance and achievement, the
so-called income effect of a cash
transfer programme.
However, income is not the only
determinant of school attendance and
achievement. Parent’s education and
other family background features also
matter. Lloyd and Blanc (1996) show for
some selected African countries that the
education of the household head also
determines the educational outcomes of
their offsprings. To address these types
of determinants, some cash transfer
programmes have included conditioning
components, since the cash alone might
not be enough to neutralize the parental
background effect.Poverty in Focus   August 2008    27
Evidence from a
needs assessment
exercise on the profile
of a population that is
excluded from a service




Based on the assessment of the supply-
side determinants, governments may
focus on increasing the number of
schools and related facilities, and on
improving the quality of education.
In this regard, a comprehensive needs
assessment based on school data can help
the different needs to be placed in priority
order, so as to ensure better planning and
more effective allocation of resources.
CCT programmes are usually based on
encouraging the demand (household)
side of access to public services.
Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged
that social gaps are not only determined
by demand factors.
Scarcity of facilities and poor service
quality also explain why there are high
rates of child mortality and malnutrition,
and why most children are not in school.
In rural Mozambique, for example,
building more schools has a greater
impact on primary school attendance
than programmes that increase
household income (Handa, 2001).
A needs assessment can provide such
information, indicating whether the
constraints are on the supply or
demand side.
CCT programmes are, in general,
perceived as a demand side intervention
(see article by Pablo Villatoro in this
issue). However, due to the recognition
that supply-side constraints might
jeopardise their success, many
programmes have already been
applying the word “co-responsibility”
rather than “conditionality” to
highlight governments’ responsibility
in addressing supply-side shortcomings
In Honduras, the Programa de Asignación
Familiar (PRAF II) included a supply
component. However, an ex ante
evaluation, which is part of a needs
assessment, shows that primary school
coverage has no significant impact on
school attendance among boys, a
circumstance explained mainly by family
background and the availability of
pre-school facilities.
Increasing supply has a significant
impact only on school attendance
by girls. In this case, a cash transfer
programme with conditionalities would
be appropriate because there is a group
of children whose attendance is not
affected by improvements in the supply
of primary schools (Ribas et al., 2008).
A profile of the population that is
excluded from a service is also essential
for choosing the proper targeting method
to be used. Efficiency in resource-
allocation is related to whether and how
the programme is targeted.
On the one hand, targeting methods
entail efficiency gains given the same
amount of transfers. On the other hand,
they also involve some costs. When a
good targeting mechanism is very
expensive for a specific country, the
country could be advised to adopt a
less expensive method, even if it is less
technically complex, that gives more fiscal
space to provide benefits to other poor
households. Such a decision will surely
depend on local constraints. It can also
raise political concerns about the method
of targeting and calls for the management
of risks. In this case, different scenarios
may have different costs that could be
outlined in a prior needs assessment.
Another issue that must be assessed
before implementing a CCT programme
is the capacity of the institutional
settings. Targeting mechanisms, payment
systems, and the monitoring and
enforcement of co-responsibilities
depend on institutional capacity.
In Brazil, for instance, the decentralized
targeting system works because there
had already been local systems for
managing social policies before
Bolsa Família.
In other countries without a similar
background, such a system might result
in clientelism if central government
guidelines are poorly enforced at the
local level. Such capacity for implementing
a centralized or a decentralized system
can be evaluated by a needs assessment
before the programmes are implemented.
With regard to basic social protection
interventions, such as CCT programmes,
affordability is another source of
discussion. Policymakers may draw
attention to all kinds of costs involved
and the sources of financing.
The fiscal space surrounding the
implementation of a CCT programme
depends on the available national
budget resources and donations. It has
been found that the former source can
be more sustainable when aligned with a
poverty reduction strategy, indicating
that a particular government has made a
strong commitment to social protection.
A needs assessment can show that social
protection benefits are not out of reach
for low-income countries, even if
international assistance is needed
temporarily (see Krzysztof Hagemejer’s
article in this issue).
Finally, by providing empirical
evidence on the specific determinants
of access to social services, as well as
on the institutional and financial
capacities that are required and available,
needs assessments serve as strategic
tools in the design and implementation
of CCT programmes, especially in places
where poverty eradication is still far from
being achieved.
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Pensions usually have legal protection
that is enshrined in constitutions or
binding legal documents. These legal
provisions protect social transfers from
budgetary cuts resulting from economic
downturns and political changes. But not
all cash transfer programmes are subject
to such provisions—by which we mean a
framework, established by a legislature,
which is not easily reversible. We also
mean a framework that provides
constitutional and statutory rights
with the purpose of guaranteeing
access to basic services.
Cash transfer programmes are
proliferating, but problems may arise if
they have a fragile legal framework or
none at all. It is important to provide
beneficiaries with legal protection,
especially given the long-term objectives
of human capital building. In the first
article of this issue of Poverty in Focus,
Degol Hailu and Fabio Veras Soares note
that cash transfer programmes attract
votes. The programmes’ association with
prominent politicians may compromise
their sustainability, and thus it is of great
help to institutionalise them. One way of
doing this might be to strengthen the
legal framework under which the
programmes are regulated.
Table 1 presents programmes that have
clearly defined legal frameworks. These
laws and decrees are specifically
designed for the programmes listed,
which we consider the best way to
guarantee sustainability and continuity.
It is useful to look closely at the country
case studies. In her article for this issue of
Poverty in Focus, Tatiana Britto explains
the process leading to the establishment
of Brazil’s cash transfer programme, Bolsa
Família. In January 2004, a bill was finally
approved by President Lula after 10 years
of deliberations in Congress. The law
affirms the right to a basic income in
order to obtain food, education and
health care. Although it falls short of
providing universal rights, it gives
priority to the poorest. Brazil also has a
less well-known but equally important
unconditional targeted cash transfer
programme, the Benefício de Prestação
Continuada (Continuous Cash Benefit),
which is a monthly transfer to poor
people aged over 65 or with disabilities.
This cash transfer scheme is also
guaranteed by the constitution.
The Chilean Chile Solidário conditional
cash transfer programme is regulated
by the May 2004 Chile Solidario Law.
Indexation of benefits to inflation is one
the strengths of this legal framework.
South Africa has developed an extensive
social security system, including the Child
Support Grant, Old Age Grant, Disability
Grant, Grant in Aid, Care Dependency
Grant and Foster Child Care Programme.
These are regulated and legally
recognised by the Social Assistance Act,
and are supported by constitutional
legislation. This approach marks a new
strategy in the field of social protection
in South Africa, and makes the national
government responsible for ensuring
social security rights.
Mozambique’s Programa de Subsídio
Alimentar (Food Subsidy Programme),
established by decree on 25 August 1993,
is an important initiative in the fight
against poverty and inequity. Under this
decree, eligible individuals are entitled to
receive cash transfers.
In September 2005, the government
of the Dominican Republic issued a decree
that created the Solidaridad programme as
an important component of the country’s
social protection network. The decree set
out the programme’s vision and
by Degol Hailu, Marcelo Medeiros
and Paula Nonaka,
International Poverty Centre




of human capital building.
Cash transfer programmes
need comprehensive legal
support that is carefully
designed for each initiative
and established by statute.
Legal Protection
for Cash Transfers:
Why We Need ItPoverty in Focus   August 2008    29
does not fit into the category of schemes
with a specific protective legal framework.
In Bangladesh, the Primary Education
Development Programme is based on the
Primary Education Act, but as in Mongolia
the law does not provide a specific legal
framework for the programme.
Ghana’s social grants programme,
Livelihood Empowerment Against
Poverty, provides both conditional and
unconditional cash transfers to its target
populations. There are general laws
and policies that may constitute a legal
framework for the programme, such
as the 1992 constitution and the 1991
Social Security Law. But a specific
regulation is still lacking, although
this is under discussion.
In conclusion, cash transfer programme
need comprehensive legal support that is
carefully designed for each initiative and
established by statute. Policymakers
and the designers of such programmes
should be aware that their sustainability
is threatened if they have fragile legal
frameworks or none at all. 
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2005 Social Welfare Law
and 2006 amendments
Constitution, revised in 2004
Primary Education Act,1990
Primary Education Plan (PEDP), 2002
1992 constitution
Social Security Law 247 of 1991
The Children’s Act, 1998, (Act 560)
Labour Law, 2005 (Act)
strategies, as well as its functional
and institutional structures.
India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act of 2005 supports a cash
transfer programme known as the Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme. The act
enforces the government’s provision of
social protection and the public’s right to it.
The six programmes outlined
above are regulated by a legal apparatus,
and thus represent a fundamental rights-
based approach to social protection.
Moreover, their legal status strengthens
their sustainability and continuity,
protecting them against fiscal shocks
and political changes.
By contrast, the programmes listed in
Table 2 are only vaguely covered by
constitutions and general laws. They are
based mainly on policy statements, as
well as on operational manuals and
guidelines, and we consider them to
be less protected from political
and economic fluctuations. Compared
to the programmes in Table 1, they are
relatively vulnerable. The programmes
function well and their impacts may be
positive, but their scope, continuity
and legitimacy would be greater if
they had a legal framework.
In Ethiopia, the Productive Safety
Net Programme does not enjoy
constitutional recognition. It may
come under the aegis of some related
legislation, but it is not supported
by its own specific law. The programme
is regulated by an implementation
manual and a management plan.
Mongolia’s programme, Child Money, is
based on the 2005 Social Welfare Law
and its 2006 amendments. This law,
however, covers social protection in
broad terms, and thus the programme
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Social Assistance Act, Act 13, 2004
Boletim da República, I Série.
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Decree 1 16/93, 25 August 1993.
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agenda on cash transfer
programmes. It is currently
focused on comparative studies
in selected countries in Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa.
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quantitative and qualitative
methods and ex ante and
ex post analyses of the impact
of cash transfers on poverty
and inequality.
‘Dolores del Crecimiento’: Desafíos Clave para Nuevos Programas de Transferencias
Monetarias Condicionadas en Latinoamérica. Fabio Veras Soares and Tatiana Britto.
One Pager # 44. August 2008.
The Recent Impact of Government Transfers on Poverty in Honduras and Alternatives to
Enhance their Effects. Rafael Guerreiro Osório. Working Paper # 47. August 2008.
New York’s Brand-new Conditional Cash Transfer Programme: What if it Succeeds?
Michelle Morais de Sa e Silva. One Pager # 60. July 2008.
Los Desafíos del Programa de Transferencias Monetarias Condicionadas en El Salvador,
Red Solidaria. Tatiana Britto. Country Study # 9. June 2008.
Les Transferts d’Argent Peuvent-ils tous Réduire les Inégalités?
Sergei Suarez Dillon Soares and Eduardo Zepeda. One Pager # 36. June 2008.
Targeted Cash Transfer Programmes in Brazil: BPC and the Bolsa Familia.
Marcelo Medeiros, Tatiana Britto and Fabio Veras Soares. Working Paper # 46. June 2008.
Los Logros y las Carencias de las Transferencias de Efectivo Condicionadas: Evaluación
del Impacto del Programa Tekoporã del Paraguay. Fabio Veras Soares, Rafael Perez Ribas
and Guilherme Issamu Hirata. Evaluation Note # 3. May 2008.
¿Los CCTs Reducen la Pobreza? Eduardo Zepeda. One Pager # 21. April 2008.
Transferências Condicionadas de Renda (TCR) Reduzem a Pobreza?
Eduardo Zepeda. One Pager # 21. April 2008.
Assessing Honduras’ CCT Programme PRAF, Programa de Asignación Familiar:
Expected and Unexpected Realities. Charity Moore. Country Study # 15. April 2008.
Achievements and Shortfalls of Conditional Cash Transfers: Impact Evaluation of
Paraguay’s Tekoporã Programme. Fabio Veras Soares, Rafael Perez Ribas and Guilherme
Issamu Hirata. Evaluation Note # 3. March 2008.
Debatiendo los Métodos de Focalización para las Transferencias Monetarias:
Índice Multidimensional vs. Proxy de Ingresos para el Programa Tekoporã de Paraguay.
Rafael Perez Ribas, Guilherme Issamu Hirata and Fabio Veras Soares.
Evaluation Note # 2. March 2008.
Debating Targeting Methods for Cash Transfers: A Multidimensional Index vs. an
Income Proxy for Paraguay’s Tekoporã Programme. Rafael Perez Ribas, Guilherme Issamu
Hirata and Fabio Veras Soares. Evaluation Note # 2. January 2008.
¿Pueden Todas las Transferencias Monetarias Reducir Desigualdades?
Sergei Suarez Dillon Soares and Eduardo Zepeda. One Pager # 36. January 2008.
Todas as Transferências de Renda Diminuem a Desigualdade?
Sergei Suarez Dillon Soares and Eduardo Zepeda. One Pager # 36. January 2008.
Encarando las Limitaciones en la Capacidad para Transferencias Monetarias
Condicionadas en Latinoamerica: Los Casos de El Salvador y Paraguay.
Fabio Veras Soares and Tatiana Britto. Working Paper # 38. January 2008.
Recent IPC  Publications
on Cash TransfersPoverty in Focus   August 2008    31 Poverty in Focus   August 2008    31
IPC regularly publishes and
disseminates its research using
nine publication formats
Poverty in Focus:
Presents a collection of short articles
on a popular format
One Pagers:
Spark discussion on a particular topic
Policy Research
Briefs:
Draw major policy lessons
Country Studies:
Present case studies from a
research project
Working Papers:
Disseminate findings from an
in-depth research
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